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Where Race and Political Behavior Highly Correlate
Within a Congressional District, it is Unlikely that
the District Will be Held to be an Unconstitutional
Racial Gerrymander: Easley v. Cromartie
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - STRICT SCRUTINY
- RACIAL GERRYMANDERING - The United States Supreme Court
held that a North Carolina congressional districting plan did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because race was not the predominant factor motivating the state
legislature's districting decision.
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)*
North Carolina's serpentine-shaped Twelfth Congressional District
meanders down Interstate 85 through six counties, picking up
urban and heavily African-American concentrated areas in parts of
Charlotte, Winston-Salem and Greensboro.1  North Carolina
residents sued state officials alleging that the legislature violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution by drawing the Twelfth District with
race as the "predominant factor."2 Easley v. Cromartie marked the
fourth time that the Court heard arguments relating to District 12.3
Due to population growth measured in 1990 Census figures,
North Carolina gained an additional congressional district: District
12.4 The. first two cases to come before the Court, Shaw I and
Shaw II, revolved around the North Carolina legislature's initial
attempt at redistricting.- Before the redistricting, the former District
12 contained a majority of African-American voters.6 White voters
* Governor Michael F. Easley was substituted for former Governor James B. Hunt, Jr.
(listed in the initial caption), pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 35.3.
1. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) ("Cromartie IF).
2. Cromartie II, 532 U.S at 237.
3. Id. The first three cases were: Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) ("Shaw F), Shaw
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw II), and Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)
("Cromartie F).
4. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 633.
5. Cromartie I, 532 U.S at 237-38.
6. Id. North Carolina is comprised of 100 counties, 40 of which fall under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 633. Any jurisdiction subject to Section
5 is prohibited from making changes in a "standard practice or procedure with respect to
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residing in District 12 sued, claiming that the district was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs had a valid claim, stating that the
legislature drew the former district's boundaries for race-based
reasons if the proponents could allege that legislation, though "race
neutral on its face," rationally could not be understood as anything
other than "an effort to separate voters into different districts on
the basis of race."8 In Shaw II, the Court determined that North
Carolina's districting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because the reapportionment scheme
was not "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."9
In 1997 the legislature started over and devised the current
redistricting plan for District 12.10 This plan was also challenged,
and a three-judge panel in the District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs, enjoining any elections from occurring under the new
plan.1 In Cromartie I, the decision of the district court was
reversed.' 2 The Supreme Court declared that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether race was the predominant
factor motivating the North Carolina legislature in drafting District
voting" without a federal court order or administrative preclearance from the United States
Attorney General approving the plan. Id. at 634. Because the North Carolina General
Assembly's proposed reapportionment plan affected counties covered under Section 5, the
state submitted its plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. Id. The Attorney General
disapproved of the plan and formally objected, prompting North Carolina, without first
attempting to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of
Columbia, to enact a revised plan that created the state's second majority-black district. Id.
at 635. The first of the two majority-black districts, District 1, stretched through 29 counties,
appearing to "splatter" into portions of the Second, Third, and Seventh Congressional
Districts without any clearly defined shape. Id. A lower court judge compared the district's
shape to a "Rorschach Ink-blot test." Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 633. The other majority-black
district, District 12, extended approximately 160 miles down Interstate 85, picking up
enclaves of black neighborhoods along the way. Id. The district passed through 10 counties,
dividing towns and, frequently, the northbound and southbound lanes of 1-85. Id. at 636.
7. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 636-37. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
8. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 237-38.
9. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 902. The Court relied heavily on the district's unconventional
and "bizarre" shape in the way it split boundaries and towns and the history of the area to
determine that racial considerations were the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
redistricting decision. Cromartie II, 121 S.Ct. at 1456.
10. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 239.
11. Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 545.
12. Id. at 546. The appellants were able to directly appeal to the United States
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, which allows any party to appeal district court
decisions from three-judge courts directly to the Supreme Court.
Vol. 40:561
2002 Easley v. Cromartie 563
12.13 Reversing, the Court instructed the district court to determine
whether the evidence was consistent with the constitutional
political objective of creating a safe Democratic seat, or whether
the legislature's motive was predominantly racial.
4
On remand, the district court concluded that the North Carolina
General Assembly used race as the "predominant factor" in drawing
District 12.15 The court's conclusion was based on: (1) statistical
evidence used to measure the compactness of a district; 6 (2) a
state senator's statement made in a committee hearing that
declared that the 1997 plan should be enacted because, among
other things, it ensured "racial balance;" 7 and (3) a disparaging
email sent by a state employee to the state senator in which the
employee indicated he had moved the Greensboro black
community into District 12, necessitating further changes to the
plan.' 8 The district court determined that the legislature drew the
boundaries of District 12 "to collect precincts with high racial
identification rather than political identification."19 Determining
that the district was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
13. Cromartie 11, 532 U.S. at 239.
14. Id. at 241.
15. Id. at 237. Because the district court determined that the district was drawn with
race as the "predominant factor," strict scrutiny was applied.
16. Id. at 240. The Court relied considerably on two statistical methods used to
measure the compactness of a Congressional district: dispersion and perimeter compactness
indicators. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 ESupp.2d 407, 415-19. (E.D.N.C. 2000). Dispersion
compactness measures the geographic dispersion of a district by drawing a circle around the
district and producing a coefficient, which is the proportion of the area of the circumscribed
circle that is also included in the district Cromartie, 133 FSupp.2d at 415-19. The coefficient
ranges from 1.0 (most compact)-to 0.0 (least compact); a low dispersion compactness
measure is less than or equal to 0.15. Id. District 12 had a dispersion compactness indicator
of 0.109, lower than all districts in North Carolina and other challenged and reconstituted
districts in Florida, Texas, Georgia, and illinois. Id. The second statistical indicator is
perimeter compactness. Id. This indicator yields a coefficient that is the proportion of the
area in the district relative to a circle with the same perimeter. Id. Again, the coefficient
ranges from 1.0 to 0.0, with a low perimeter compactness measuring less than or equal to
0.05. Cromartie, 133 F.Supp.2d at 415-19. District 12's perimeter compactness indicator was
0.041, making it the most "geographically scattered" of all North Carolina's congressional
districts and among the least compact in the nation. Id.
17. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 241. State Senator Roy Cooper led North Carolina
Democrats in the redistricting process. Cromartie, 133 ESupp.2d at 412. At a 1997 meeting
of the Legislature's House Congressional Redistricting Committee, Cooper argued that the
plan should be adopted because it "provides for a fair geographical, racial and partisan
balance throughout the State of North Carolina." Id. at 419.
18. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 241. Gerry Cohen was the state employee charged with
the technical aspects of drawing the districts. Cromartie, 133 F.Supp.2d at 420. He sent an
email to Senator Cooper describing how he added the "Greensboro Black community" into
the Twelfth District, which meant he needed to take 60,000 other citizens out of that district.
Id.
19. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 240 (emphasis in original).
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state interest, the district court ordered the North Carolina
legislature to redistrict the 1997 plan or face a forced redistricting
by the court.20 The state defendants filed a direct appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1253, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
21
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, stated that the
issue in Cromartie II was evidentiary - whether, based on the
evidence presented, the district court clearly erred in determining
that District 12 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander with
race as the "predominant factor" motivating the legislature's
districting decision.3 Justice Breyer declared that the burden of
proof on the party attacking the motivation of a districting decision
is "demanding," requiring the proponent to establish, at a minimum,
that traditional race-neutral districting principles were subordinated
to racial considerations.2
Under this analysis, the plaintiffs must either prove that race was
the "predominant factor" that motivated the legislature's districting
decision, or, that an otherwise facially neutral law is "unexplainable
on grounds other than race."24 The burden is justified because
legislatures "must have discretion to exercise the political judgment
necessary to balance competing interests."2 Legislative discretion is
especially necessary when a high correlation exists between race
and party preference. 26 After establishing the standard of review,
the Court began a systematic attack on the evidence to show that
the district court's findings were clearly erroneous.
27
Justice Breyer detailed four major reasons why the district
court's findings, based on the evidence, were in clear error.2s First,
the district court's determination of "race, not politics" was
20. Cromartie, 133 E Supp.2d. at 423. District Judge Thornburg dissented, arguing
primarily that strict scrutiny should not be applied merely because the North Carolina
General Assembly drafted a race-conscious redistricting plan. Id. at 427. In his view, the
plaintiffs, having the burden of proof, failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that race was the "predominant factor" in the redistricting of District 12. Id.
21. Hunt v. Cromartie, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000).
22. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 241. "As a basis for appellate review, a finding is 'clearly
erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on entire
evidence is left with definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." BLACK's LAW
DICMONARY 143 (6th ed. 1991).
23. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 241.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 241-242. For example, the majority cited Cromartie I to illustrate that a black
super-majority in one congressional district adjacent to black voters comprising less than a
plurality in neighboring district is insufficient, standing alone, to prove that race was the
motivating factor in drawing district lines. Id.
26. Id. at 242.
27. Cromartie 11, 532 U.S. at 243.
28. Id. at 244.
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founded on evidence of voter registration, not voter behavior.2
Second, the factual determinations underlying the district court's
holding did not provide significant additional support for the
district court's conclusion.3° Third, the district court dismissed the
testimony of Dr. Peterson, the appellant-defendants' expert witness,
without rejecting any of the significant factual supporting
information that he provided at trial.3 ' Finally, at trial, the plaintiffs
presented charts summarizing evidence of voting behavior that
tended to refute the court's "race, not politics" conclusion.
3 2
The Court recognized that evidence of voting 'registration is
problematic because in North Carolina, party registration and party
preference do not always correspond.33 White registered Democrats
cross party lines to vote for Republicans more often (in 60-70/6 of
elections) than did black Democrats, who consistently vote along
the party line (in 90-95% of elections),a4 The majority noted that this
voting pattern demonstrates that a district heavily composed of
African-American precincts may be organized for political rather
than racial reasons. 5
The Court next outlined the five factual determinations that the
district court relied upon to conclude that race was the
predominant factor in drafting District 12: (1) legislators excluded
many heavily-Democratic precincts from District 12, even when
those precincts immediately bordered the Twelfth; (2) the
testimony of expert witness Dr. Weber, stating that race
predominated over party affiliation in the composition of District
12; (3) the testimony of the plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Peterson, was
unreliable and irrelevant; (4) the testimony of Senator Cooper,
stating that there was a need for "racial and partisan balance;" and
(5) the Cooper-Cohen email reported that the Greensboro black
community had been moved into the Twelfth District, necessitating
removing 60,000 people from that district. 6
The Court determined that the conclusions of Dr. Weber, an
expert in redistricting, contradicted his own evidence, and offered
"little insight into the legislature's true motive."3T For example,




32. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 244.
33. Id. at 245.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 240-41.
37. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 246-47.
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was sufficient to create a safe Democratic seat, while conceding
that District 12 created a greater-than-60% reliable Democratic
district s38 Weber also attacked the legislature's motives in placing
certain majority-white precincts outside of District 12; however, he
could not refute the fact that none of the excluded white districts
were as reliably Democratic as the black precincts included in the
district.39 Finally, Wber testified that the legislature could have
crafted a safe Democratic district without including the large
number of majority-black precincts by using means besides race.4°
Noting that "the Constitution does not place an affirmative
obligation on the legislature to avoid creating districts that turn out
to be heavily, even majority, minority," Justice Breyer found that
Weber failed to provide any evidence that the North Carolina
Legislature drafted District 12 for predominantly racial reasons.
41
Neither did he find Dr. Weber's evidence to show that a politically
practicable alternative plan existed.
42
Next, the majority reviewed the testimony of Dr. Peterson, the
state's primary expert witness.43 Peterson declared that the
boundaries of a district drawn predominantly on racial
considerations would correlate more with race than politics.44 He
completed a boundary segment analysis that compared
corresponding precincts immediately inside and outside of District
12 to establish whether district boundaries had a stronger
correlation with race or politics.45 Peterson's findings demonstrated
that politics was as good an explanation for the makeup of District
12 as was race.46 The evidence he compiled, in the form of maps
comparing the district's boundaries with Democrat/Republican
voting behavior rather than party registration, further influenced
the Court to conclude that the legislature drew district boundaries
that kept more reliable Democratic voters in the twelfth district,
38. Id. at 246.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 248.
41. Id. at 249. (emphasis in original).
42. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 249-50. Weber would have had the Court adopt an
alternative plan, adopted by the legislature in 1998 in response to court challenges over the
1997 plan. Id. at 250. This plan was not helpful, according to the Court, because it still
divided communities along racial lines while making District 12 less reliable for Democrats.
Id. Under this plan, a group of highly Democratic precincts was transferred into two safely
Republican districts, a result the 1997 plan sought to avoid. Id.
43. Id. at 251.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 252.
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leaving less-reliable voters out.47
Finally, the Court reviewed the two pieces of evidence relied
upon by the district court to establish the North Carolina
Legislature's discriminatory intent: Senator Cooper's testimony and
the Cohen-Cooper email. State Senator Cooper, in testimony before
a legislative committee in 1997, asserted that the plan satisfied a
need for "racial and partisan balance."48 According to the majority,
the district court simply construed the statement as admitting the
need for a "racial . . . balance."49 The district court ignored, inter
alia, the word "partisan," and failed to consider whether race
played a predominant role in the districting decision.50 Justice
Breyer concluded that the statement accomplished little more than
establishing that race was a consideration in the districting
process, because the statement did not show that race, in
comparison to partisan and geographic considerations, was the
"predominant factor" motivating the legislature. 51
The other piece of evidence relied upon by the district court was
an email sent from Gerry Cohen, the legislative staffer responsible
for drafting districting plans, to Senator Cooper and Senator Leslie
Winner.52 In the email, Cohen wrote: "I have moved the Greensboro
Black community into the 121h and now need to take [about] 60,000
out of the 12th I await your direction on this."53 Although the
majority conceded that the reference to race, i.e. "Black
community," was obvious, the Court pronounced the email to be
more important for what it did not discuss6 The email failed to
address: (1) why black voters from Greensboro were placed in the
12th District; and (2) the political consequences of not including
them.55 As a result, the Court found the email to be "less persuasive
than the kinds of direct evidence we have found significant in other
redistricting cases."56
Justice Breyer concluded the majority opinion by stating that,
47. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 253. His entire statement was: "Those of you who dealt with Redistricting
before realize that you cannot solve each problem that you encounter and everyone can find
a problem with this Plan. However, I think that overall it provides for a fair, geographic,












although there was some evidence that supported the district
court's conclusion, the evidence as a whole failed to prove that the
legislature drew District 12's boundaries using race as the
"predominant factor," the primary reason being that, in District 12,
race has a high correlation with political behavior.57 He stated:
In a case such as this one where majority-minority districts (or
the approximate equivalents) are at issue and where racial
identification correlates highly with political affiliation, the
party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show
at the least that the legislature could have achieved its
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are
comparably consistent with traditional districting principles.58
Here, according to the Court, the plaintiffs simply failed to meet
their burden of proof.59 Therefore, the judgment of the district
court was reversed.60
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, dissented,61  scolding the majority for
disregarding its role as a reviewing court and engaging "in its own
factual enterprise."62 According to Justice Thomas, the district
court's conclusion that race was the predominant factor motivating
the North Carolina Legislature was a factual finding that should be
overturned only if the Supreme Court has a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."63 The dissent
suggests that the district court's decision was based on reliable
evidence, and, therefore, its conclusions were not "clearly
erroneous. "64
Encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause declares: "No State
57. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 257.
58. Id. at 258.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 260 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 262-67. The dissent stated that the district court relied on several key pieces
of evidence, including: (1) objective measures of compactness; (2) the expert testimony of
Dr. Weber indicating that Democratic precincts with low black populations were excluded
from District 12; (3) Weber's testimony declaring that districting decisions were
unexplainable by political motives; (4) the district court's belief that Dr. Peterson's evidence
was unreliable because it was incomplete; and (5) Senator Cooper's "racial balance"
testimony and the Cohen-Cooper email. Id. Justice Thomas stated that the district court's
finding of racial predominance, based on the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom, was
"permissible, even if not compelled by the record." Id. at 267 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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shall make or enforce any law which shall.. : deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."6 Equal
protection, in the constitutional sense, is based on a theory of
individual rights, emphasizing that minorities are afforded the same
protections and individual rights that those in the majority enjoy.66
Frequently, minorities were denied their equal protection rights in
the racially segregated South; prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Baker v. Carr,67 the actions of states in drawing legislative
districts were off limits to the Court, seen as nonjusticiable
political questions.68 In Baker v. Carr, however, the Court ruled
that an allegation of a denial of equal protection flowing from
legislative redistricting presents a justiciable constitutional cause of
action.69
Expanding upon the holding in Baker, the Court in Reynolds v.
Simms faced whether the Equal Protection Clause required
substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens in a
state, regardless of where they reside.70 The Court held that the
"fundamental principle of representative government in this country
is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without
65. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
66. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARv J. L & P. POL'Y 103, 107 (2000).
67. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Deference was given to precedents such as Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), in which the Court held that an equal protection challenge to the
Illinois legislature's reapportionment scheme was a non-justiciable political question. In his
dissent, Justice Black stated that the reapportionment scheme violated the petitioners'
constitutional right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 568.
68. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186. The Court's decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), is illustrative. In Gomillion, the Alabama State Legislature drafted a law that
redefined the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama and changed the shape of the city from a
square to a 28-sided figure. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340. The effect was to remove from the
city almost every black voter. Black citizens brought an action claiming that the alteration of
the city's shape constituted discrimination against them in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the 141h Amendment, and denied them the right to vote under the 150, Amendment.
Id. The Court's decision that the action was unconstitutional rested on the 151h Amendment.
According to the majority, the legislature's actions deprived the citizens of the right to
franchise by changing the city's boundaries. Id. at 347. Of greater interest, however, was the
concurring opinion of Justice Whittaker. He stated that the decision should rest on the 141h
Amendment, not the 15"' Amendment. Id. at 349. As he persuasively concluded, "the right
... to vote" is the right to vote as all others within the same election precinct enjoy it. Id.
Thus, the move out of Tuskegee did not affect the petitioners' right to vote. Justice
Whittaker believed that the State's purpose of "fencing Negroes out of" Tuskegee was an
unlawful racial segregation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Gomillion, 364 U.S.
at 349. However, he was certain to mention that the 14th Amendment claims should be
decided on grounds of segregation and not upset "the Colegrove problem" (i.e., racial
gerrymandering cases are non-justiciable political questions). Id. See supra note 67.
69. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
70. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a
State."71 Explaining, Justice Douglas for the majority stated:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres... as long as
ours is a representative form of government, and our
legislatures are those instruments of government elected
directly by and directly representative of the people, the right
to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a
bedrock of our political system. It could hardly be gainsaid
that a constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation
that certain otherwise qualified voters had been entirely
prohibited from voting for members of their state legislature.
And, if a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one
part of the State should be given two times, or five times, or
10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the
State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of
those residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively
diluted.
72
The Court concluded by enunciating the famous "one man, one
vote" principle, declaring that "an individual's right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a
substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living in other parts of the State."73
Similarly, in White v. Regester, the Supreme Court confronted the
issue of whether multimember districts that had erected barriers to
the nomination and election of minority candidates violated the
Equal Protection rights of voters within those districts.74
Multimember districts, districts from which more than one
representative to the state legislature are elected from a single
district, are not unconstitutional per se.75 Furthermore, an Equal
Protection claim cannot be sustained where the racial group
allegedly discriminated against does not have legislative seats in
proportion to its voting potential.76 The burden is on the
complainants to advance evidence that supports "that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open
to participation by the group in question - that its members had
less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
71. Reynods, 377 U.S. at 560-61.
72. Id. at 562.
73. Id. at 568.
74. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
75. White, 412 U.S. at 765.
76. Id. at 766.
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participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice. "77
In White, the Court examined the political processes of Dallas
County, Texas existing at the time of the lawsuit, and noted that a
Texas law required a majority vote to win a nomination during a
primary election.78 Also, a "place" rule existed to limit candidates
for legislative office from a multimember district to a specified
place on the ticket.79 Furthermore, the Dallas Committee for
Responsible Government, the white-dominated organ of the
Democratic Party that was in control of candidate "placing" or
"slating," had only slated two black candidates since the
Reconstruction.a° The result was a primary system dominated by
white candidates that restricted the ability of minority candidates
to have their names on the primary ballot.
8'
Because Dallas County did not afford black voters or candidates
the same treatment as whites enjoyed, the Court concluded that the
multi-district system was unconstitutional.8 2 The order of the
three-judge panel of the district court requiring disestablishment of
two of the multimember districts was affirmed because the
minorities in the district had lesser opportunity than whites to
participate in the political process and elect candidates of their
choice.A8
Baker, Reynolds, and White demonstrate, as noted by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent in Miller v. Johnson, that the Equal
Protection Clause will be invoked to justify intervention in "the
quintessentially political task of legislative districting" in two
circumstances: (1) to enforce the one-person-one-vote requirement;
and (2) to prevent dilution of a minority group's voting strength.84
For a state engaged in the redistricting process, however, statutory
demands under the Voting Right' Act of 1965 must be met in
addition to constitutional demands under the Fourteenth
Amendment.8a Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits states




80. White, 412 U.S. at 766.
81. Id. at 767.
82. Id. at 767, 769-70.
83. Id. at 769.
84. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Invariably,
racial gerrymandering cases fall under the latter category.
85. 79 Stat. 439 (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
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voting practices or procedures based on race or color.86 Members
of a class of citizens can establish a Section 2 violation if they
show that they have less of an opportunity than other members of
the electorate "to participate in the electoral process and to elect
representatives of their choice."87 Section 2 specifically states,
however, that there is no "right for members of a protected class to
have its members elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population."8
The landmark Supreme Court case interpreting Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act is Thornburg v. Gingles.89 In Gingles, the Court
resolved whether using a legislative redistricting plan of
multimember black districts in five North Carolina legislative
districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by impairing
the opportunity of black voters to "participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."90 In analyzing
a Section 2 claim, the test is not the intent of the plan, but rather
the plan's results.91 According to the majority, the essence of a
Section 2 claim is that "a certain law, practice or structure interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their
preferred representatives. "92 Though the use of multimember
districts is not per se unconstitutional,93 voters contending that a
particular districting plan violates Section 2 must prove that the
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Section 2 states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in
section 4(0(2) [42 USCS § 1973b(f)(2)], as provided in subsection (b). (b) A violation
of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance
which may be considered.- Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to





89. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
90. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34.
91. Id. at 43.
92. Id. at 47.
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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multimember structure operates to minimize or cancel out their
ability to elect their preferred candidate. 4
Uncertainty over the analysis of Section 2 claims led the Court to
develop the famous Gingles preconditions - three prima facie
factors that must be satisfied before the Court can determine that
Section 2 has been violated. 95 The preconditions are:
1. The minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district;
2. The minority group must be able to show that it is
politically cohesive; and
3. The minority must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it - in the
absence of special circumstances, such as the minority
candidate running unopposed - usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate.9
The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
concluded, and the Supreme Court agreed, that black citizens
constituted "a distinct population and registered-voter minority in
each challenged [legislative] district."97 For example, the political
cohesiveness of one of the districts was evident in voting statistics
indicating that black voters supported black candidates between
71-9206 of the time.98 In contrast, on average, 82% of white voters
did not vote for any black candidate in the jbrimary elections.9
Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of white Democrats did not vote for
black candidates that won primaries and ran in the general
elections, even when the choice was between voting for a black
Democratic candidate or a Republican.0 0° Additionally, evidence
also showed that, in multi-candidate fields, the names of black
candidates were consistently ranked at the bottom of the ballot. 10 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court,
concluding that the majority of challenged districts violated Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act.1°2
A racial gerrymandering claim can also implicate Section 5 of the
94. Ging/es, 478 U.S. at 48.
95. Id. at 50.
96. Id. at 50-51.
97. Id. at 38.
98. Id. at 59.
99. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 59.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 80.
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Voting Rights Act.'03 Section 5 provides that certain covered states
or political subdivisions'0 4 are prohibited from enforcing "any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard practice or
procedure with respect to voting" unless: (1) the jurisdiction
obtains a declaratory judgment from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia stating that such change "does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," or (2) the
proposed change is submitted to the Attorney General who does
not object to it.'05
In Beer v. United States, the city of New Orleans sued under
Section 5 and sought a declaratory judgment from the D.C. District
Court that the reapportionment of its city council districts did not
have the "purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color."1 6  Under the previous
apportionment plan, drawn prior to the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act, none of New Orleans' five council districts had a clear
majority of black voters, and no black candidates had been elected
to the New Orleans City Council with the former plan in effect.107
After the redistricting plan, blacks would constitute a majority of
the population in two of the five districts, being a clear majority of
registered voters in one of them.10 8 The district court determined
that the plan abridged the right of minorities to vote.' °9 The court
calculated that "if black voters could elect city councilmen in
proportion to their share of the city's registered voters, they would
be able to choose 2.42 of the city's seven councilmen, and, if in
proportion to their share of the city's population, to choose 3.15
councilmen." 10 According to the district court, black votes were
diluted because it was likely that blacks would only be able to
elect one black candidate on city council."'
103. 42 U.S.C. §1973c (1982).
104. Id. Such states are subject to Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973b
because of a history of past racial discrimination in voting practices and procedures.
105. Id.
106. 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976)
107. Beer, 425 U.S. at 135.
108. Id. New Orleans' plan called for seven councilmen to be elected. Id. There are five
districts encompassing the city, each of which elected a councilman; two other councilmen
were elected by the city at large. Id.
109. Id. at 136.
110. Id.
111. Id. The plan under review in Beer produced black population majorities in two
districts and a black voting majority in one. Id. At the time of redistricting in 1961,
approximately 45% of the city's population was black. Id. at 135.
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The Supreme Court, on appeal, disagreed.112 The Court viewed
the issue to be whether a redistricting plan that enhances the
position of racial minorities can constitute a violation of Section
5.113 A legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise can hardly have the effect of diluting or
abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning
of Section 5.114 In the plan at issue, the position of minorities was
enhanced by the creation of two districts with black majorities
because, under the former plan, none of the five districts had a
majority of black citizens."5 The district court's proposition that
minorities in New Orleans should control greater than two districts
based on their percentage of the population was rejected by the
Court, which noted that members of a minority have no federal
right to be represented in legislative bodies in proportion to their
number in the general population."6 The Court concluded that
where the effect of a redistricting plan is ameliorative, not
retrogressive, the apportionment cannot violate Section 5 unless
the new plan itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as
to violate the Constitution."
7
The interplay between Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
the Fourteenth Amendment, and racial gerrymandering claims is
seen in a series of cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw
I'D. a8 As previously mentioned, Shaw I involved an action alleging
that the initial District 12 drafted by the North Carolina legislature
was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9 The
district court had concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state an
Equal Protection claim because the state's purpose was to comply
with the Voting Rights Act, which it did to the district court's
satisfaction, without leading to a proportional statewide
underrepresentation of white voters. 20 On appeal, the Supreme
Court framed the issue to be whether a claim of racial
gerrymandering could be brought under the Equal Protection
112. Beer, 425 U.S. at 130.
113. Id. at 141.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 136. See supra note 88 and accompanying text
117. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
118. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 630.
119. Id. at 636-37. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text




The majority determined that a plaintiff challenging a
reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may
state a claim by "alleging that the legislation, though race neutral
on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than
an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of
race."1' 2  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had
consistently applied strict scrutiny to state laws that expressly
classify citizens by race.' 23 Here, the Court extended the reach of
strict scrutiny to facially neutral redistricting laws so bizarre on
their face that they are "unexplainable on grounds other than
race." 24 The "bizarre" and "irrational" shape of District 12125 led the
Court to conclude that the plaintiffs had stated a claim under
which relief could be granted. 26 The case was reversed and
remanded to the district court for resolution of "whether the North
Carolina redistricting plan is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest."
127
After Shaw I was remanded, another redistricting case, Miller v.
Johnson, came before the Court. 28 Miller revolved around
Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District and involved the issue of
whether parties can rely on evidence other than the bizarre shape
of a district to establish race-based districting. 29 The Court
reasoned that parties alleging a racial gerrymander "are neither
confined in their proof to evidence regarding the district's geometry
and makeup nor required to make a threshold showing of
bizarreness."' 30 However, for the complainants to meet their burden
of proof, they must prove that the questioned statutes subject to
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause are "motivated by
a racial purpose or object."'3 ' Plaintiffs challenging legislative
redistricting must prove that race was the "predominant factor"
motivating the legislature's districting decision. 3 2 Demonstrating
that "traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not
121. Id. at 641-42.
122. Id. at 649.
123. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 644. See infra note 127.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 6 for a discussion of District 12's shape.
126. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658.
127. Id. The requirement that a state law must be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest is known as the strict scrutiny standard.
128. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
129. Mi//er, 515 U.S. at 913.
130. Id. at 915.
131. Id. at 913.
132. Id. at 916.
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limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, are
subordinated to racial considerations" can show this.133
Once it is determined that a district has been drawn with race as
the "predominant factor," the Court will apply a strict scrutiny
review, with redistricting legislation only able to survive an Equal
Protection challenge if the state demonstrates that its districting
legislation is "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest."134 Compliance with federal antidiscrimnination laws, such
as Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, provide no
justification for a redistricting program that was not "reasonably
necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those
laws."'3 Similarly, a determination by the Attorney General that
race-based districting, necessary to comply with the Voting Rights
Act, is not sufficient to prove, that the legislation is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Only the judicial
branch can make that determination, otherwise, the judiciary would
be violating the separation of powers doctrine and surrendering its
role in enforcing constitutional limits on race-based official action
to the Executive Branch.'3
Applying the facts of Miller, the Court found race to have been
the predominant factor motivating the legislature in drawing
Georgia's Eleventh District. 37 The shape of District il was not
"bizarre" on its face; however, evidence from state officials
revealed an objection by the Georgia Attorney General to the
Justice Department claiming that the state would have to "violate
all reasonable standards of compactness and contiguity" to
construct three majority-black districts.138 This, along with a
comprehensive report issued at trial that displayed the Eleventh
District's lack of tangible communities of interest and fractured
political, social and economic interests within the district's black
population, led the Court to find that the district was constructed
with race as the predominant factor.'39
To counter that finding, Georgia argued that it had a narrowly
tailored compelling state interest in drafting District 11 -
133. Id.
134. Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 921, accord. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
137. Id. at 919.
138. Id.
139. Miller, 515 U.S. at 919.
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compliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.14° The Court
noted that it had no doubt that Georgia intended to create a third
majority-black district in order to satisfy the Justice Department's
preclearance demands.'4 ' However, Georgia's drawing of the
Eleventh District as a majority-black district was not required
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because there was no
reasonable basis to believe that the state's earlier plans, which
increased the number of Georgia's majority-minority districts,
violated Section 5.142 The state's earlier plans were ameliorative -
because the number of Georgia's majority-minority districts were
increased, the plan could not violate the nonretrogression
principle. 143 The purpose of Section 5 is to ensure that there is no
retrogression in voting procedures, and a plan that is ameliorative
cannot violate Section 5 unless the new apportionment
discriminates on the basis of rape or color so as to violate the
Constitution, such as the Equal Protection Clause. 144 According to
the Court, the Justice Department's objective in mandating a third
majority-black district was "far removed from this purpose."
145
Thus, Section 5 did not provide a narrowly tailored compelling
state interest sufficient to survive strict scrutiny.
146
Prior to the Court's ruling in Miller v. Johnson, a district court in
North Carolina, on remand from Shaw ,1 '47 decided that North
Carolina's redistricting plan for District 12 classified voters by race;
however, to the district court, that the classification survived strict
scrutiny because the State's reapportionment scheme was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.14 The district court's
ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and in Shaw II, the
Court decided whether the North Carolina reapportionment plan
was actually narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.149 Citing Shaw I and Miller, the Court commented that the
burden of proving a race-based motive is on the proponent, who is
required to meet the burden by either. (1) circumstantial evidence
140. Id. at 921.
141. Id. Redistricting plans of the Georgia Legislature were rejected twice by the
Justice Department; the Justice Department finally granted preclearance after Georgia
crafted a third majority-black district, the Eleventh. Id. at 907.
142. Id. at 923.
143. Id. at 924.
144. Mi/er, 515 U.S. at 924.
145. Id. at 926.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
148. Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 901-02.
149. Id. at 902.
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of a district's shape or demographics (Shaw 1); or (2) more direct
evidence going to the legislature's purpose (Miller).' ° Because the
district court determined that the North Carolina General Assembly
had deliberately drawn District 12 to have an effective voting
majority of black citizens, the Court used strict scrutiny to examine
the redistricting plan.
1 5'
The Court analyzed the three compelling interests that the
district court found to have existed that allowed the plan to survive
strict scrutiny:
1. The eradication of past and present discrimination;
2. North Carolina's duty to comply with §5 of the Voting
Rights Act; and
3. The State's interest in avoiding §2 liability.'
52
In the Court's view, the first interest was not compelling because
an interest in ameliorating past racial discrimination did not
precipitate the use of race in the redistricting plan.1'3 Secondly,
with respect to the State's duty to comply with Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, the majority disagreed that creating a second
majority-black district in North Carolina was required by Section
5.1-4 Citing Mil/er, where a similar argument was rejected; Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted, "compliance with that [Section 5] law
could not justify race-based districting."'' Finally, although the
Court agreed that compliance with Section 2 could be a compelling
interest, it was not in this case because District 12's creation was
not "narrowly tailored" to its asserted end.'a For avoidance of
Section 2 liability to be considered a compelling state interest, the
racial classification must "remedy the anticipated violation or
achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored."' 5 In Shaw II, District
12 could not remedy any potential Section 2 problem because
liability is established only if the minority group is "geographically
compact," and the shape of District 12 confirmed that it was
anything but "compact."158 Furthermore, the Court found that the
new district did not address the United States Attorney General's
original complaints that black voters living between the
150. Id. at 905.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 910-15.
153. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 910. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 911.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 915.
157. Id. at 916.
158. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 916. See supra notes 6, 8, and 16 and accompanying text.
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south-central and southeastern regions of North Carolina faced
discrimination because these voters were not included in the new
District 12.w *
A case decided on the same day as Shaw II, and involving the
same issues in a Texas congressional redistricting plan, was Bush
v. Vera.160 The Court explained that strict scrutiny is to be applied
to redistricting legislation when such legislation is so "extremely
irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an
effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard
for traditional districting principles."16 In resolving whether strict
scrutiny should be applied, the Court discussed three factors
weighing towards the application of strict scrutiny: (1) that Texas
had neglected traditional districting criteria such as compactness;
(2) that the state was committed from the outset to creating
majority-minority districts; and (3) that Texas manipulated district
lines to exploit detailed racial data.16 2
The Court cited the influential study on districting compactness
performed by Professors Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi,'63
which ranked Texas's 1991 redistricting plan among the worst in
the nation, and the three challenged districts, in particular, among
the twenty-eight least compact congressional districts nationwide.M
In terms of a commitment to creating majority-minority districts,
the most influential piece of evidence was a letter submitted by
Texas to the Department of Justice for Section 5 preclearance, in
which the state reported that the proposed three new districts
"should be configured in such a way as to allow members of racial,
ethnic and language minorities to elect Congressional
representatives."16 The most compelling evidence pointing toward
manipulation of district lines was Texas's use of a computer
program that contained racial data at the block-by-block level. 166 In
fact, the new District 30 used this computer data to split individual
streets in many places. 67 Sixty percent of residents in Districts 18
and 29 lived in split precincts, leading to a disruption in traditional
159. Id. at 917.
160. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
161. Vera, 517 U.S. at 958.
162. Id. at 962.
163. Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH.
LREV. 483 (1993). See supra note 16.
164. Vera, 517 U.S. at 960.
165. Id. at 960-61.
166. Id. at 961.
167. Id. at 970.
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forms of political activity - for example, Harris County had to
increase its number of voting precincts from 672 to 1,225 to
accommodate the new Congressional boundaries.'1 Examining all
three of the challenged districts, the Court determined that the
district court did not err in applying strict scrutiny.16
This brought the Court to its second issue: whether the plan had
a narrowly tailored compelling state interest so as to survive strict
scrutiny.170 The Court first discussed that compliance with Section 2
could only be a compelling state interest if the three Gingles
preconditions were met.1 71 In this case, the Court found that the
first element of the test, that the minority group is sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district, was not met.'72 As the Court noted, if the
minority population is so widely dispersed that a reasonably
compact minority district cannot be created, a majority-minority
district is not required under Section 2.173 Thus, Texas did not have
a compelling state interest under Section 2.11
4
An interest in ameliorating the past effects of racial
discrimination can be a compelling state interest if two conditions
are met: (1) the discrimination is specific and identified; and (2)
the state has a strong evidentiary basis for concluding that
remedial action is necessary before it embarks on an affirmative
action program.175 In Vera, Texas claimed that remediation was
necessary because racial bloc voting had diluted the minority vote;
this, however, was the "same concern that underlined the State's §2
defense."'7 6 Because racial bloc voting is not a specific, identified
discrimination, but rather a general premise, the Court concluded it
was not a valid justification.'7
Finally, the Court addressed Texas' assertion of a compelling
state interest under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.'78 Section 5
has a limited substantive goal to ensure that no voting procedure
changes exist to lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
168. Id. at 974.
169. Vera, 517 U.S. at 965, 986.
170. Id. at 976.
171. Id. at 979. See supra note 96 and accompanying text
172. Id. at 978-79.
173. Id. at 979.
174. Vera, 517 U.S. at 979.






franchise. 79 As the Court explained, "[nionretrogression is not a
license for the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure
continued electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority's
opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be
diminished, directly or indirectly by the state's actions."'80 Here,
Texas indicated that the creation of the majority-minority districts
was necessary to ensure nonretrogression.' 8' Therefore, the Court
concluded that none of the three challenged districts survived strict
scrutiny - all were declared unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.' 2
Abrams v. Johnson's'. came to the Court as a result of the
remand in Miller. When Miller went back on remand, and once it
became clear that the Georgia Legislature could not draw a new
redistricting plan, the District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia drafted its own redistricting plan for the state.'84 The
district court's plan contained only one majority black district; the
absence of a second or third majority black district, which existed
in Georgia's original redistricting plan, precipitated an Equal
Protection challenge.'85 On appeal, the Supreme Court faced two
major issues: (1) whether the district court erred in drafting its
plan by disregarding the State's legislative policy choices; and (2)
whether the district court's plan violated Sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. 86
In creating a court-authored redistricting plan, the district court
must consider legislative preferences. 8 7 The Court cited Upham v.
Seamon,'88 a Texas case where the Court found that legislative
preferences were not being complied with under court
reapportionment.19 In Upham, the Attorney General objected to
only a specific part of the plan, the apportionment of two districts
in Southern Texas. 9° The district court, required to draw new lines,
redrew the districts at issue and also some unrelated districts in
Dallas County.'91 According to the majority, Upham can be
179. Vera, at 982-83.
180. Id. at 983.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 986.
183. 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
184. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 78.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 85.
188. 456 U.S. 37, 38 (1982).





distinguished from Abrams for two reasons: (1) the precleared plan
in Abrams'9 did not deserve the same deference as the Texas plan
because it subordinated traditional districting principles to racial
considerations; and (2) the constitutional violation in Abrams
affected so large an area that any remedy undertaken by the
district court would necessarily affect almost every district in
Georgia. 193 No legislative plan existed to demonstrate that a second
or third majority-black district could be drawn within the
constitutional requirements that race not predominate over
traditional districting principles.1
94
To resolve whether the district court violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court declared that it would
assume that "courts should comply with the section when
exercising their equitable powers to redistrict." 95 In an almost
reverse application of the Gingles preconditions, the Court upheld
the findings of the district court that the black population of the
Georgia district was not sufficiently compact for a second
majority-black district, and that no high degree of racially polarized
voting existed.196 Past election results showed that white voters
were generally willing to vote for black candidates - in fact, all
three black incumbents won under the court plan, two in
majority-white districts running against white candidates. 97 Thus,
the plan did not violate Section 2.198
Next, in determining whether the district court's plan violated
Section 5 retrogression principles, the chief issue was deciding
which benchmark the district court should have used to measure
retrogression.199 The Abrams appellants-plaintiffs argued that a 1991
plan containing two majority-black districts should be used as the
benchmark; contrarily, the Justice Department argued that the 1992
pre-cleared plan containing three majority-black districts should be
used.2°0 However, the Court determined that neither of these
benchmarks was appropriate. 20' The Court enunciated the rule that
if "an existing practice or procedure which, upon submission, was
192. Id. at 86. The precleared plan, allowing for three majority-minority districts in
Georgia, was ruled unconstitutional in Miller. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text
193. Id. at 86.
194. Abrams, 521 U.S at 88.
195. Id. at 90.
196. Id. at 92.
197. Id. at 93.
198. Id.
199. Abrans, 521 U.S. at 95.




not in effect on the jurisdiction's applicable date for coverage and
is otherwise not enforceable under §5, it cannot serve as a
benchmark."202 The benchmark to be applied under Section 5 is the
last legally enforceable practice or procedure used by the
jurisdiction.203 In Abrams, the appropriate benchmark was Georgia's
1982 redistricting plan.2°4 Under that plan, as under the
court-ordered plan, Georgia had one majority black district.2 5 The
plaintiffs argued that the district court's plan was retrogressive
under the 1982 plan because, under that plan, one out of ten
districts was majority black (10%), while under the new plan one
out of eleven districts was majority black (9%).206 However, this
decrease in percentage, according to the majority, is not a
retrogression. 20 7 The Court stated that such an application of
Section 5 would be contrary to the Voting Rights Act because it
would require that each time a state with a majority-minority
district gained a congressional district, it would be compelled to
add only a majority-minority district.
208
The review of the cases involving racial gerrymandering claims
has illustrated that determining whether race is the predominant
factor motivating a state legislature's districting decision is a
fact-intensive enterprise. 2°9 As demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
holding in Cromartie 1,210 the motivation of the legislature is a
genuine issue of material fact.21' Thus, each particular case must be
analyzed within its own factual context. Because classifications
based on race are afforded heightened protection under the Equal
Protection Clause, strict scrutiny is applied if proponents alleging a
racial gerrymander meet, at a minimum, one of two tests: (1) that
traditional race-neutral districting principles were subordinated by
the state legislature to racial considerations; and/or (2) that an
otherwise facially neutral law is unexplainable on grounds other
than race. In determining whether a redistricting plan is entitled to
strict scrutiny review, the Court will focus on two types of
evidence: direct evidence as to the legislature's purpose, and
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id. (citing 28 CFR §51.54(b)(1)).





209. See J. Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEORGE MASON L REV.
431, 447 (Spring 2000).
210. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text
211. See supra note 13.
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circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics. 2 2 A
redistricting plan can survive strict scrutiny only if it is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
Examples of traditional race-neutral districting principles as
named in Miller are, inter alia, compactness, contiguity of district
boundaries, and respect for political subdivisions and communities
of interest.213 In Miller, the primary piece of direct evidence relied
upon by the Court to show that racial considerations trumped race
neutral districting decisions was a letter from the Georgia State
Attorney General to the Justice Department claiming that the state
would "violate all standards of compactness and contiguity" if the
legislature followed the plan that was eventually adopted.21 4 As was
later shown in Cromartie II, however, such direct statements must
be considered within the factual context in which they were made.
In Cromartie II, statements made by legislators and staff were not
dispositive indications of whether race was the predominant factor
motivating the districting decision; in that case, the Court
determined that the statements demonstrated only that race was a
consideration in the districting decision.215  None of the
cases examined has declared that race cannot be a relevant
consideration in the districting decision. It is only when race is the
predominant factor in the legislature's consideration that strict
scrutiny is warranted. As Cromartie H demonstrates, a legislative
predisposition to craft a district based primarily on racial concerns
is not always easily discovered by examining statements made by
legislators and their staffs. In terms of this type of evidence, it
seems that nothing short of a tacit acknowledgement by legislators
or their staffs that racial considerations are trumping traditional
race-neutral districting decisions (e.g., Miller) will cause the Court
to conclude that race is the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's districting decision.
Miller, as well as Vera, relied on the nature of the
reapportionment data used by state legislatures to make their
districting decisions in order to determine that state legislative
districting plans were predominantly motivated by race. The Miller
Court expressed concern over a comprehensive report of Georgia's
Eleventh Congressional District that depicted that the "district
lacked tangible communities of interest" and that "fractured
212. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 905.
213. Mi!er, 515 U.S. at 916.
214. Id. at 919. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 51, 57-58 and accompanying text.
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political, social and economic interests [existed] within the
Eleventh District's black population."2 16  Evidence in Vera,
illustrating that the Texas legislature manipulated district lines by
using a computer program that provided racial data at the
block-by-block level, was another example of disrespect for
traditional districting decisions. Using such a program permitted
the manipulation of election data at an unprecedented level,
ignoring foundational units such as precinct and census tracts in
the process, and resulting in a severe disruption in traditional
forms of political activity.217
Abnormally shaped districts, lacking compactness or contiguity,.
provide evidence that they may have been constructed
predominantly on race.218 As shown most prominently in Shaw I
and Shaw II, an irregularly shaped district that absorbs minority
populations in accordance with its abnormal shape is
circumstantial evidence of the legislature's racial motivations. The
"Shaw district" lacked compactness because of its length
(approximately 160 miles) and narrowness. It was not contiguous
because the district passed through ten counties, dividing towns
along the way.21 9 Most glaringly, the north and southbound lanes of
1-85 were frequently located in different districts. 220 The split
precincts at issue in Vera were another example of non-contiguous
districts. In that case, streets were frequently divided between
Districts 18 and 29.2 1 Of note in both Shaw I and Vera was the
reliance by the Court on the influential compactness study
performed on congressional districts by Professors Pildes and
Niemi. The Court accepted the study primarily because it was a
benchmark against which to measure the compactness of other
districts across the country. In both cases, the districts invalidated
were, according to the study, some of the least compact in the
nation.
222
Once strict scrutiny is applied, a racial classification can only
216. Id. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
217. Vera, 517 U.S. at 960-61. As previously noted, Harris County had to increase the
number of voting precincts from 672 to 1,225 in order to accommodate the new plan. See
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
218. One commentator has stated that a district is contiguous if "it is possible to travel
from one part of the district to another part without crossing the district boundary." Hebert,
supra note 209, at 451. A contiguous district is "not divided into two or more discrete parts."
Id.
219. See supra note 6.
220. Id.
221. Vera, 517 U.S. at 970.
222. See supra notes 16 and 163 and accompanying text.
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survive, and not violate the Equal Protection Clause, if it is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that compliance
with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act is sufficient to
survive strict scrutiny review. Although the Court has hinted that
compliance with Section 2 may, under some circumstances, survive
strict scrutiny,22 there has yet to be a case where a redistricting
plan has survived under Section 2. Mainly this is because all three
Gingles preconditions must first be satisfied before Section 2 can
provide a compelling state interest.22 In Shaw II, Vera, and
Abrams, the Section 2 arguments failed because the minority
groups in those districts were not sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district.
Likewise, it is difficult for the state to argue that compliance
with Section 5 allows a districting plan to survive strict scrutiny. A
state's duty to comply with Section 5 does not justify race-based
districting.2 A state must be able to demonstrate that the creation
of a majority-minority district is necessary to ensure
nonretrogression in the position of minorities' effective right to
vote. If a new districting plan adds an additional majority-minority
district, the plan is ameliorative and cannot be a violation of
Section 5. With the Court's holding in Abrams, that a districting
plan containing the same number of majority-minority districts as a
previous plan is not retrogressive, it is difficult to imagine any
instance in which compliance with Section 5 could survive strict
scrutiny.
The question remains: what type of district will be invalidated
following Cromartie II? The majority decision makes it even more
difficult to challenge and defeat an alleged racial gerrymander in
cases where race correlates with political behavior. Proponents of
alleged racial gerrymander must prove three elements to be
successful: (1) the state legislature drew boundaries "because of
race rather than because of political behavior (coupled with
traditional, non-racial districting considerations);"226  (2) the
legislature could have used alternate means, consistent with
traditional districting principles, to achieve permissible and
legitimate political objectives;227 and (3) the districting alternatives
223. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 915.
224. Vera, 517 U.S. at 978-79
225. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 911.
226. Cromatie II, 121 S.Ct. at 1466 (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 1462.
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"would have brought about significantly greater racial balance."m
This is a heavy burden for plaintiffs alleging a racial gerrymander
to satisfy. The Court specifically mentions "majority-minority
districts (or the equivalent thereof)" in articulating this standard.
Thus, rather than the "predominant factor" test in Miller, or the
"unexplainable on grounds other than race" test in Shaw II,
plaintiffs bringing a racial gerrymandering suit have additional
burdens to satisfy to successfully demonstrate a racial
gerrymander that alternative means, besides redistricting, exist to
achieve political objectives and that those means will bring about
greater racial balance.
' If the minority population in a district is less than 50%, a plaintiff
will have more difficulty proving that a state intended for race to
be the predominant factor motivating its districting decision, i.e.,
that the district was drawn because of race. It cannot be said,
however, that a district in which minorities are not in the majority
will never be invalidated. Challenges against minority-influenced
districts are more likely to be successful under the Shaw II test;
such a district would have to be so irregularly shaped as to be
"unexplainable on grounds other than race." Notwithstanding thi
possibility, it is most likely that future successful racial
gerrymandering claims will be brought against majority-minority
districts that violate the test articulated in Cromartie II. As
Justice Breyer pointed out in Cromartie II, however, there is no
affirmative obligation placed on legislatures by the Constitution to
avoid creating majority-minority districts.m Furthermore, the
difficulty is enhanced in a situation such as Cromartie H where
there is a high correlation between race and party politics.
Of course, a district from which those involved in the
redistricting process admit that race was the predominant
consideration likely will render a district unconstitutional. As
Cromartie H demonstrated, though, this is difficult to prove. More
likely, a district will be invalidated where a state legislature
mic.ro-manages the districting process to the point that the district
is so irregular on its face that it can only be viewed as an effort to
classify voters on the basis of race. This micromanagement is
manifested in two ways. First, where the shape of a district is so
bizarre, with its bizarre shape following minority demographics, it
must lack any reasonable semblance of compactness and
228. Id.




contiguity. This was the district at issue in Shaw I and Shaw I.
However, with the Supreme Court's determination in Cromartie II
that the new District 12 (very similar in shape to its predecessor,
which was declared unconstitutional) was not an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander, one cannot state with any certainty what type
of district could fail Shaw Irs bizarre-shape test.
The second type of micromanagement, seen in every case
invalidated after Shaw I, is the use of computer programs that
provide racial data down to the census block level. The Court
condemned the use of census blocks as the fundamental unit for a
redistricting plan in Vera primarily because the use of such units is
open to manipulation and allows a state to focus too heavily on
race in drawing district lines.2 1 Commentator J. Gerald Hebert has
provided a compelling argument for requiring state legislatures to
use precincts and census tracts as the building blocks for a
redistricting plan.2 2 This process would help to ensure that a state
is following traditional race-neutral districting principles instead of
grouping voters by race.2
State legislatures faced with redistricting in the post-Cromartie II
era should take heed of the wide latitude that they are given to
make districting decisions. When crafting a district, legislatures
have the discretion to consider race in the districting process.Y It
is only when race predominates the legislature's districting decision
that a districting plan will be ruled unconstitutional. The cases we
have examined, culminating with Cromartie II, demonstrate that
only a grave error in the districting process will cause a
legislature's decision to be overturned. Proponents seeking to prove
a racial gerrymander after Cromartie II face a daunting challenge.
They are faced with the difficult task of proving either that race
was the predominant factor in the districting decision, or that the
district's construction is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race." With the addition of the new test articulated in Cromartie
231. Hebert, supra note 209, at 461.
232. Id.
233. Id. Hebert states that the use of these devices effectively forecloses the degree of
racial fine-tuning that the Court condemned in Vera, and helps ensure that congressional
districts are not dramatically irregular in shape. Id. at 462.
234. This is an important statement from the Supreme Court Beginning with the Shaw
I line of cases, it was uncertain to what degree, if at all, race could be used in designing
districts. With Cromartie II, the Court conclusively notes that race, like other factors in the
political process of reapportionment, is a valid consideration. As long as the district is not
created because of race, and there are not alternative means to achieve the legislature's




II,235 plaintiffs must further establish that alternative means exist to
achieve the political objectives sought by the redistricting plan, and
that those means will effect a greater racial balance. An intelligent
legislature that watches what it says during the process, constructs
districts where race and political identification highly correlate, and
uses census tracts and precincts as the building blocks of a
congressional district, will likely survive any constitutional
challenge to its districting decision. In the future, only a major
error by a state legislature will cause districting decisions to be
invalidated as racial gerrymanders.
Robert F Kravetz
235. See supra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
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